Record production TV self-update verification

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Elijah Kuntz 2026-10-18 09:10:02 -07:00
parent 97bc3465a0
commit dc5908cb3b

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@ -48,10 +48,20 @@ No launcher application was disabled or uninstalled. Screensaver selection at th
Build validation uses aapt2, javac, D8, zipalign, and apksigner signature verification. There are no third-party runtime libraries.
Final APK (1.1.1): 2,749,526 bytes. SHA-256: `b145da41c95c927562f41d6052443723e377c7c40e775c078be0aa41ffefd19b`.
Final APK (1.1.5): 2,753,622 bytes. SHA-256: `9556c053f5c1ebb7e7b9414596ee2b2185a37161044538617490713bb9dd8228`.
## Updater regression — October 18, 2026
The same-signature updater test ran against the installed 1.1.0 bootstrap and a newer signed 1.1.1 APK. It passed persisted daily network scheduling, Off cancellation, branch-to-commit pinning, a real APK download and certificate/package/version/checksum verification, and private provider read access. It rejected an incorrect checksum, another signing key, a different package, a mismatched version code, oversized metadata declarations, and public HTTP sources. The provider rejected write requests and unknown paths. The current version was not offered as an update. Test preferences were restored afterward.
The production default is the public HTTPS Forgejo feed in `output/update.json`, generated with the APK by `scripts/build.sh`. It requires no credentials on the TV. Native installer and unknown-source permission activities resolve on the onn. Android 14 device.
## Production self-update verification
A forced scheduled check against the real public HTTPS repository found a newer version while Android settings stayed foreground. Android recorded the Luma update notification, and Home showed the Update button. Downloading and verification used the commit-pinned APK from Git, not ADB. The first-use Android install-source permission screen was exercised.
Testing exposed a device-specific consequence of legacy APK/file installation: Android restricted settings reset the accessibility service list. The final flow uses a PackageInstaller session for a publisher-verified self-update (`PACKAGE_SOURCE_OTHER`), always requiring user confirmation. It does not claim to be an app store or request silent installation. Unlike a general APK file installer, Luma accepts only its own package signed by the installed key.
The final real upgrade, **1.1.4 → 1.1.5**, was downloaded from production Git and approved with the TV remote. The complete enabled-accessibility-service list matched before and after, including Luma Home, Projectivy, and Button Mapper. Restricted-settings authorization remained allowed, and the TV returned directly to Luma. No ADB install or accessibility repair was used for that final upgrade. Prior temporary configuration changes from failed installation-method tests were restored.
The source classification follows Android's [PackageInstaller source definitions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageInstaller#PACKAGE_SOURCE_OTHER); the platform's [file-source restriction implementation](https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/143db55921dd%5E%21/) explains the behavior encountered during the earlier file-install tests.