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Verify and publish V2 container / build-and-push (push) Successful in 29s
- Wrong passwords in a row are counted across every device and kept in the database. The first 3 are free; from the 3rd the next attempt waits 15 s, 30 s, 1, 2, 5, 15 and 30 minutes; the 10th locks sign-in until the unlock code printed to the server log (and saved to unlock-code.txt) is entered. Signed-in devices keep working. Only one password check runs at a time, so parallel guesses cannot skip a wait. - "Forgot password?" prints a reset code to the log (reset-code.txt), valid once for 15 minutes. It sets a new password, signs out every device, lifts any lockout and signs in. Asking again while a code is valid prints nothing new. - Codes are stored hashed; wrong codes count toward the per-address limit. RESET_ADMIN_PASSWORD also lifts a lockout. - Sign-in page: a live countdown during a wait, an unlock step and a reset step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
450 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript
450 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript
import fs from 'node:fs';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import { Hono, type Context, type MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
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import { deleteCookie, getCookie, setCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
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import { getConnInfo } from '@hono/node-server/conninfo';
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import { hashPassword, safeEqual, verifyPassword } from './crypto.ts';
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import { HttpError, readBody, type AppContext } from './http.ts';
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import { deleteSetting, getSetting, setSetting } from './settings.ts';
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import { newToken, now, sha256 } from './util.ts';
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const COOKIE = 'sd_session';
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const SESSION_MS = 30 * 86_400_000;
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const PASSWORD_MIN = 8;
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const passwordSchema = z.string().min(PASSWORD_MIN, `Use at least ${PASSWORD_MIN} characters`).max(256);
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/* ------------------------------ rate limiting ------------------------------ */
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interface Bucket {
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failures: number[];
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}
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const WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60_000;
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const MAX_PER_IP = 8;
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const MAX_GLOBAL = 40;
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const buckets = new Map<string, Bucket>();
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function recent(key: string, at: number): number[] {
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const bucket = buckets.get(key) ?? { failures: [] };
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bucket.failures = bucket.failures.filter((t) => at - t < WINDOW_MS);
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buckets.set(key, bucket);
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return bucket.failures;
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}
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function assertNotLimited(ip: string): void {
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const at = now();
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const mine = recent(`ip:${ip}`, at);
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const all = recent('global', at);
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if (mine.length >= MAX_PER_IP || all.length >= MAX_GLOBAL) {
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const oldest = (mine.length >= MAX_PER_IP ? mine : all)[0];
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const retry = Math.max(1, Math.ceil((oldest + WINDOW_MS - at) / 1000));
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throw new HttpError(429, 'rate_limited', `Too many attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil(retry / 60)} minute${retry > 60 ? 's' : ''}.`, { retryAfter: retry });
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}
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}
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function recordFailure(ip: string): void {
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const at = now();
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recent(`ip:${ip}`, at).push(at);
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recent('global', at).push(at);
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}
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export function resetRateLimits(): void {
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buckets.clear();
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}
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/* ------------------------------ sign-in lockout ------------------------------ */
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/**
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* Wrong passwords in a row, counted across every device and kept in the database so a restart
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* does not clear them. The first three are free; from the third, each one makes the next
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* attempt wait longer (seconds, by number of failures: 15 s, 30 s, 1, 2, 5, 15, 30 min); the
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* tenth locks sign-in until the unlock code printed to the server console is entered. A correct password, an unlock or a password reset starts the count again.
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* Devices that are already signed in are not affected.
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*/
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export const LOGIN_WAITS = [0, 0, 0, 15, 30, 60, 120, 300, 900, 1800];
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export const LOCKOUT_AFTER = 10;
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const GUARD_KEY = 'auth.guard';
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const RESET_KEY = 'auth.reset_code';
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const RESET_MS = 15 * 60_000;
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interface Guard {
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failures: number;
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waitUntil: number;
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locked: boolean;
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/** sha256 of the unlock code while locked. */
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unlockHash: string | null;
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}
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function readGuard(app: AppContext): Guard {
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return { failures: 0, waitUntil: 0, locked: false, unlockHash: null, ...getSetting<Partial<Guard>>(app.db, GUARD_KEY, {}) };
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}
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function clearGuard(app: AppContext): void {
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deleteSetting(app.db, GUARD_KEY);
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fs.rmSync(consoleCodeFile(app, 'unlock'), { force: true });
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}
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/** Seconds until the next sign-in attempt is allowed (0 when it is). */
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function waitLeft(guard: Guard): number {
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return Math.max(0, Math.ceil((guard.waitUntil - now()) / 1000));
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}
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function describeWait(seconds: number): string {
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return seconds < 60 ? `${seconds} second${seconds === 1 ? '' : 's'}` : `${Math.ceil(seconds / 60)} minute${seconds > 60 ? 's' : ''}`;
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}
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/** A one-time code shown only on the server console, like the first-run setup code: XXXXX-XXXXX. */
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function newConsoleCode(): string {
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return crypto.randomBytes(5).toString('hex').toUpperCase().replace(/(.{5})/, '$1-');
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}
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function codeHash(code: string): string {
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return sha256(code.trim().toUpperCase().replace(/[\s-]/g, ''));
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}
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function consoleCodeFile(app: AppContext, kind: 'unlock' | 'reset'): string {
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return path.join(app.config.dataDir, `${kind}-code.txt`);
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}
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/** Prints a console code to the server log and saves it in the data folder (readable only by the server's user). */
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function announceCode(app: AppContext, kind: 'unlock' | 'reset', code: string, what: string): void {
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const file = consoleCodeFile(app, kind);
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try {
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fs.writeFileSync(file, `${code}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
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} catch {
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/* the log line below is enough */
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}
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app.log('warn', `${what}: ${code} (also saved to ${file})`);
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}
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/** Wrong password: count it, and set the next wait or lock sign-in. Returns the message for the client. */
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function recordWrongPassword(app: AppContext): { message: string; retryAfter?: number; locked?: boolean; attemptsLeft: number } {
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const guard = readGuard(app);
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guard.failures += 1;
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const attemptsLeft = Math.max(0, LOCKOUT_AFTER - guard.failures);
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if (guard.failures >= LOCKOUT_AFTER) {
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const code = newConsoleCode();
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guard.locked = true;
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guard.unlockHash = codeHash(code);
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setSetting(app.db, GUARD_KEY, guard);
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announceCode(app, 'unlock', code, `Sign-in locked after ${LOCKOUT_AFTER} incorrect passwords in a row. Unlock code`);
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return { message: `Sign-in is locked after ${LOCKOUT_AFTER} incorrect passwords. Enter the unlock code from the server console.`, locked: true, attemptsLeft: 0 };
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}
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const wait = LOGIN_WAITS[guard.failures] ?? LOGIN_WAITS[LOGIN_WAITS.length - 1]!;
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guard.waitUntil = now() + wait * 1000;
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setSetting(app.db, GUARD_KEY, guard);
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const parts = ['Incorrect password.'];
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if (wait > 0) parts.push(`Wait ${describeWait(wait)} before trying again.`);
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if (attemptsLeft <= 3) parts.push(`${attemptsLeft} more incorrect ${attemptsLeft === 1 ? 'attempt' : 'attempts'} will lock sign-in.`);
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return { message: parts.join(' '), retryAfter: wait || undefined, attemptsLeft };
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}
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/** Throws when sign-in is locked or a wait is running. */
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function assertGuardOpen(app: AppContext): void {
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const guard = readGuard(app);
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if (guard.locked) throw new HttpError(423, 'locked', `Sign-in is locked after ${LOCKOUT_AFTER} incorrect passwords. Enter the unlock code from the server console.`);
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const left = waitLeft(guard);
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if (left > 0) throw new HttpError(429, 'rate_limited', `Too many incorrect passwords. Try again in ${describeWait(left)}.`, { retryAfter: left });
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}
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/** One password check at a time per server, so parallel guesses cannot slip past a wait. */
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const checking = new WeakSet<AppContext>();
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/* ------------------------------ request helpers ------------------------------ */
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export function clientIp(c: Context, trustProxy: boolean): string {
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if (trustProxy) {
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const fwd = c.req.header('x-forwarded-for');
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if (fwd) return fwd.split(',')[0].trim();
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const real = c.req.header('x-real-ip');
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if (real) return real.trim();
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}
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try {
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return getConnInfo(c).remote.address ?? 'unknown';
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} catch {
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return 'unknown';
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}
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}
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export function isHttps(c: Context, trustProxy: boolean): boolean {
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if (trustProxy) {
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const proto = c.req.header('x-forwarded-proto');
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if (proto) return proto.split(',')[0].trim() === 'https';
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}
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return new URL(c.req.url).protocol === 'https:';
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}
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/* ------------------------------ sessions ------------------------------ */
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function createSession(app: AppContext, c: Context): void {
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const token = newToken();
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const at = now();
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app.db.run(
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'INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, created_at, expires_at, last_seen_at, user_agent, ip) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
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sha256(token),
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at,
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at + SESSION_MS,
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at,
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(c.req.header('user-agent') ?? '').slice(0, 300),
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clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy),
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);
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app.db.run('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < ?', at);
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const secure = app.config.cookieSecure === 'auto' ? isHttps(c, app.config.trustProxy) : app.config.cookieSecure;
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setCookie(c, COOKIE, token, { httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'Lax', secure, path: '/', maxAge: Math.floor(SESSION_MS / 1000) });
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}
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/** The stored hash of this request's session token, or null when there is no session cookie. */
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export function sessionHash(c: Context): string | null {
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const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE);
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return token ? sha256(token) : null;
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}
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export function isAuthenticated(app: AppContext, c: Context): boolean {
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const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE);
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if (!token) return false;
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const hash = sha256(token);
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const at = now();
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const row = app.db.get<{ expires_at: number; last_seen_at: number }>('SELECT expires_at, last_seen_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?', hash);
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if (!row || row.expires_at < at) return false;
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// Sliding expiry, written at most once an hour.
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if (at - row.last_seen_at > 3_600_000) {
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app.db.run('UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = ?, expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?', at, at + SESSION_MS, hash);
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}
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return true;
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}
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export function requireAuth(app: AppContext): MiddlewareHandler {
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return async (c, next) => {
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if (!isAuthenticated(app, c)) throw new HttpError(401, 'unauthorized', 'Sign in to continue');
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await next();
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};
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}
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/**
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* CSRF defence for cookie-authenticated requests: state-changing calls must carry a custom
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* header (which a cross-site form cannot send, and which forces a CORS preflight that this
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* server never approves), and must not be flagged cross-site by the browser.
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*/
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export function csrfGuard(): MiddlewareHandler {
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return async (c, next) => {
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const method = c.req.method;
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if (method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD' && method !== 'OPTIONS') {
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if (c.req.header('x-requested-with') !== 'studydesk') throw new HttpError(403, 'csrf', 'Missing request header');
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// Fetch metadata is set by the browser and cannot be forged by page script. Using it
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// (rather than comparing Origin to Host) keeps this working behind proxies that rewrite Host.
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if (c.req.header('sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site') throw new HttpError(403, 'csrf', 'Cross-site request blocked');
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}
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await next();
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};
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}
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/* ------------------------------ password storage ------------------------------ */
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const HASH_KEY = 'auth.password_hash';
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const SETUP_KEY = 'auth.setup_code';
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export function isConfigured(app: AppContext): boolean {
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return Boolean(getSetting<string | null>(app.db, HASH_KEY, null));
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}
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function setupCodeFile(app: AppContext): string {
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return path.join(app.config.dataDir, 'setup-code.txt');
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}
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async function storePassword(app: AppContext, password: string): Promise<void> {
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setSetting(app.db, HASH_KEY, await hashPassword(password));
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deleteSetting(app.db, SETUP_KEY);
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fs.rmSync(setupCodeFile(app), { force: true });
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}
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/**
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* Runs at startup. Applies ADMIN_PASSWORD / RESET_ADMIN_PASSWORD, or prepares a one-time
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* setup code (printed to the log and written to the data folder) so that only someone with
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* access to the server can claim a fresh install.
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*/
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export async function initAuth(app: AppContext): Promise<void> {
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const { config, db } = app;
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if (config.resetAdminPassword) {
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passwordSchema.parse(config.resetAdminPassword);
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await storePassword(app, config.resetAdminPassword);
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db.run('DELETE FROM sessions');
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clearGuard(app);
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app.log('warn', 'Administrator password was reset from RESET_ADMIN_PASSWORD. Remove that variable and restart.');
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return;
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}
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if (isConfigured(app)) return;
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if (config.adminPassword) {
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passwordSchema.parse(config.adminPassword);
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await storePassword(app, config.adminPassword);
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app.log('info', 'Administrator password initialised from ADMIN_PASSWORD.');
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return;
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}
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let code = getSetting<string | null>(db, SETUP_KEY, null);
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if (!code) {
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code = crypto.randomBytes(5).toString('hex').toUpperCase().replace(/(.{5})/, '$1-');
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setSetting(db, SETUP_KEY, code);
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}
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try {
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fs.writeFileSync(setupCodeFile(app), `${code}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
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} catch {
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/* the log line below is enough */
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}
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app.log('info', `First-run setup code: ${code} (also saved to ${setupCodeFile(app)})`);
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}
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/* ------------------------------ routes ------------------------------ */
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export function authRoutes(app: AppContext): Hono {
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const r = new Hono();
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r.get('/status', (c) => {
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const guard = readGuard(app);
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return c.json({ configured: isConfigured(app), authenticated: isAuthenticated(app, c), locked: guard.locked, retryAfter: guard.locked ? 0 : waitLeft(guard) });
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});
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r.post('/setup', async (c) => {
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if (isConfigured(app)) throw new HttpError(409, 'already_configured', 'Study Desk is already set up');
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const ip = clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy);
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assertNotLimited(ip);
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const body = await readBody(c, z.object({ code: z.string().max(40), password: passwordSchema }));
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const expected = getSetting<string | null>(app.db, SETUP_KEY, null);
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const given = body.code.trim().toUpperCase();
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if (!expected || !(safeEqual(given, expected) || safeEqual(given, expected.replace('-', '')))) {
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recordFailure(ip);
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throw new HttpError(403, 'bad_setup_code', 'That setup code is not correct. Check the server log or setup-code.txt in the data folder.');
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}
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await storePassword(app, body.password);
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createSession(app, c);
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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});
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r.post('/login', async (c) => {
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const ip = clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy);
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assertNotLimited(ip);
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const body = await readBody(c, z.object({ password: z.string().max(256) }));
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const hash = getSetting<string | null>(app.db, HASH_KEY, null);
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if (!hash) throw new HttpError(409, 'not_configured', 'Study Desk has not been set up yet');
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assertGuardOpen(app);
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if (checking.has(app)) throw new HttpError(429, 'rate_limited', 'Another sign-in is being checked. Try again in a moment.', { retryAfter: 1 });
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checking.add(app);
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let ok: boolean;
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try {
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ok = await verifyPassword(body.password, hash);
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} finally {
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checking.delete(app);
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}
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if (!ok) {
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// Wrong passwords follow the lockout schedule alone; the per-IP limit is for wrong codes.
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const wrong = recordWrongPassword(app);
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if (wrong.locked) throw new HttpError(423, 'locked', wrong.message);
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throw new HttpError(401, 'bad_password', wrong.message, { retryAfter: wrong.retryAfter, attemptsLeft: wrong.attemptsLeft });
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}
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if (readGuard(app).failures > 0) deleteSetting(app.db, GUARD_KEY);
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createSession(app, c);
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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});
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/** Lifts a lockout with the code printed to the server console. The password is still needed to sign in. */
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r.post('/unlock', async (c) => {
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const ip = clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy);
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assertNotLimited(ip);
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const body = await readBody(c, z.object({ code: z.string().max(40) }));
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const guard = readGuard(app);
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if (!guard.locked) return c.json({ ok: true });
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if (!guard.unlockHash || !safeEqual(codeHash(body.code), guard.unlockHash)) {
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recordFailure(ip);
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throw new HttpError(403, 'bad_code', 'That unlock code is not correct. Check the server console or unlock-code.txt in the data folder.');
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}
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clearGuard(app);
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app.log('info', 'Sign-in unlocked with the console code.');
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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});
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/**
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* Forgotten password, step 1: prints a reset code to the server console (valid 15 minutes).
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* While a code is still valid, asking again does not print another.
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*/
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r.post('/reset/request', (c) => {
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if (!isConfigured(app)) throw new HttpError(409, 'not_configured', 'Study Desk has not been set up yet');
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assertNotLimited(clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy));
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const current = getSetting<{ hash: string; expiresAt: number } | null>(app.db, RESET_KEY, null);
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if (current && current.expiresAt > now()) return c.json({ ok: true, expiresAt: current.expiresAt });
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const code = newConsoleCode();
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const expiresAt = now() + RESET_MS;
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setSetting(app.db, RESET_KEY, { hash: codeHash(code), expiresAt });
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announceCode(app, 'reset', code, 'Password reset requested. Reset code (valid 15 minutes)');
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return c.json({ ok: true, expiresAt });
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});
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/** Forgotten password, step 2: the console code sets a new password, signs out every device, lifts any lockout and signs in here. */
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r.post('/reset', async (c) => {
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const ip = clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy);
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assertNotLimited(ip);
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const body = await readBody(c, z.object({ code: z.string().max(40), password: passwordSchema }));
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const current = getSetting<{ hash: string; expiresAt: number } | null>(app.db, RESET_KEY, null);
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if (!current || current.expiresAt <= now()) throw new HttpError(410, 'code_expired', 'That reset code has expired. Ask for a new one.');
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if (!safeEqual(codeHash(body.code), current.hash)) {
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recordFailure(ip);
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throw new HttpError(403, 'bad_code', 'That reset code is not correct. Check the server console or reset-code.txt in the data folder.');
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}
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await storePassword(app, body.password);
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deleteSetting(app.db, RESET_KEY);
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fs.rmSync(consoleCodeFile(app, 'reset'), { force: true });
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clearGuard(app);
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app.db.run('DELETE FROM sessions');
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app.log('warn', 'Administrator password was reset with the console code. Every device was signed out.');
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createSession(app, c);
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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});
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r.post('/logout', (c) => {
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const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE);
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if (token) app.db.run('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?', sha256(token));
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deleteCookie(c, COOKIE, { path: '/' });
|
|
return c.json({ ok: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
r.post('/password', requireAuth(app), async (c) => {
|
|
const ip = clientIp(c, app.config.trustProxy);
|
|
assertNotLimited(ip);
|
|
const body = await readBody(c, z.object({ current: z.string().max(256), next: passwordSchema }));
|
|
const hash = getSetting<string | null>(app.db, HASH_KEY, null);
|
|
if (!hash || !(await verifyPassword(body.current, hash))) {
|
|
recordFailure(ip);
|
|
throw new HttpError(403, 'bad_password', 'Current password is incorrect');
|
|
}
|
|
await storePassword(app, body.next);
|
|
// Sign out every other device.
|
|
const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE);
|
|
app.db.run('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash != ?', token ? sha256(token) : '');
|
|
return c.json({ ok: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
r.get('/sessions', requireAuth(app), (c) => {
|
|
const current = sha256(getCookie(c, COOKIE) ?? '');
|
|
const rows = app.db.all<{ token_hash: string; created_at: number; last_seen_at: number; user_agent: string; ip: string }>(
|
|
'SELECT token_hash, created_at, last_seen_at, user_agent, ip FROM sessions WHERE expires_at > ? ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC',
|
|
now(),
|
|
);
|
|
return c.json({
|
|
sessions: rows.map((s) => ({
|
|
id: s.token_hash.slice(0, 12),
|
|
createdAt: s.created_at,
|
|
lastSeenAt: s.last_seen_at,
|
|
userAgent: s.user_agent,
|
|
ip: s.ip,
|
|
current: s.token_hash === current,
|
|
})),
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
r.post('/sessions/revoke-others', requireAuth(app), (c) => {
|
|
const current = sha256(getCookie(c, COOKIE) ?? '');
|
|
const { changes } = app.db.run('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash != ?', current);
|
|
return c.json({ revoked: changes });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|